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Supreme Court Repeaters
Jason Iuliano*
Ya Sheng Lin**
A case that receives cert once is special. A case that receives cert twice
is truly exceptional. This Article is the first to examine the phenomenon of
"Supreme Court Repeaters." Although Repeaters may seem like mere
curiosities, they are actually a valuable part of the Supreme Court's docket.
Our analysis reveals that the Justices use Repeaters in three ways: (1) to set up
important substantive questions that could not be addressed on the first pass,
(2) to supervise lower courts, and (3) to address different substantive issues
that arise at distinct points in litigation. In this Article, we investigate
Supreme Court Repeaters from the last ninety years andpresent our findings.
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INTRODUCTION

Each year, the Supreme Court receives nearly ten thousand
petitions for certiorari.1 And each year, the Supreme Court grants cert
to fewer than one hundred cases. 2 Among these cert-worthy cases, the
vast majority make only one appearance before the Court. The
Justices hear the parties' arguments, issue their opinions, and send
the case on its way-never to review it again. A small number of
cases, however, defy the odds and obtain certiorari more than once.
This Article is the first to examine what makes these cases so special. 3
Why-when ninety-nine percent of cert petitions fail-do some cases
warrant two, or even three, appearances before the Supreme Court? In
4
short, why are there "Supreme Court Repeaters"?
We start our inquiry by identifying every Repeater that has
occurred since 1925-the year the modern cert process began.
Although they are relatively few in number, Repeaters are a
consistent part of the Supreme Court's docket. In fact, they have been
present in more than two-thirds of the Court's terms. At first glance,
Repeaters may seem like nothing more than curious, but unimportant,
features of the Court's docket. In reality, however, they are valuable
tools that the Court has employed in some of its most noteworthy
5
decisions. Landmark cases such as Employment Division v. Smith,
United States v. Ballard,6 Ashcroft v. ACLU7 and the Scottsboro Boys

1.
See Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, JudicialIndependence in Excess: Reviving
the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 635 n.269 (2009) (noting that
the Court receives "approximately 10,000 filings per year from all federal and state courts,
nearly all of which are certiorari petitions").
2.
See Thomas W. Merrill, Justice Stevens and the Chevron Puzzle, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
551, 565 (2012) (observing that the Supreme Court decides approximately eighty cases each
term).
3.
The only prior treatment of this subject is in a brief, but informative, blog post. See
Richard M. Re, SCOTUS Repeaters, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 16, 2015, 2:10 AM), http://prawfsblawg
.blogs.comlprawfsblawg/2015/01/scotus-repeaters.html
[https:/perma.cc/CLN9-UCVC] (coining
the term "SCOTUS Repeaters" and discussing several possibilities for why they occur).
4.
We follow Richard M. Re in using this term. See id.
5.
494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding "that the right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
6.
329 U.S. 187 (1946); 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (holding that "the truth or verity of
respondents' religious doctrincs or beliefs should [not] have been submittcd to the jury").
7.
542 U.S. 656 (2004); 535 U.S. 564, 585 (2002) (holding "that [the Child Online
Ptutcction Act's] iuliallu

oil Luffiiiunity standad

tu idetitfy 'material that is haiimful to inirs'

does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for purposes of the First
Amendment").
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Trials 8 are all Supreme Court Repeaters. The significance of these and
many other Repeaters illustrates the need for a comprehensive
investigation into this phenomenon. In this Article, we seek to fill that
gap, and in doing so, we find that there are three types of Repeaters:
(1) Procedural, (2) Supervisory, and (3) Incidental.
First, "Procedural Repeaters" arise when a case presents a certworthy substantive issue that cannot be decided before a preliminary
procedural question is resolved. 9 On its own, the procedural question
would likely not obtain a hearing before the Court. However, the
Justices take on this question in the initial case in order to clear the
path for the substantive claim. The Justices do this with the
knowledge that, on the case's second hearing, they will be able to
address the underlying substantive issue that is at the heart of the
controversy.
Second, "Supervisory Repeaters" facilitate the Court's ability to
monitor lower courts. 10 This supervision can occur in two different
ways. The first method is known as pure error correction. These are
cases in which a lower court clearly misinterprets--or actively
disregards-the Supreme Court's remand instructions. When this
occurs, Repeaters allow the Justices to step in and fix noncompliant
rulings. Through this form of oversight, the Court helps ensure that
its decisions are followed.1 1 The second method arises when the
Supreme Court ruling in the first case is ambiguous. In these
Supervisory Repeaters, the Court uses the second case to build upon
or clarify its earlier ruling. These cases often involve complex
principles that are sensitive to minor changes in the fact patterns. As
such, this form of Supervisory Repeater tends to proceed as follows: In
the initial case, the Supreme Court sets out a principle. Then, in the
repeat case, the Supreme Court clarifies an ambiguous aspect of the

Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935)
8.
(holding that cxcluding blacks from serving on a jury is an uneonstitutional violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61-65
(1932) (requiring states to inform illiterate defendants that they have the right to counsel).
9.
See infra Part III.A.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. As scholars have found, the threat of reprimand acts as a powerful incentive for lower
courts to comply with Supreme Court rulings. See, e.g., Tom S. Clark, A Principal-Agent Theory
of En Banc Review, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 76 (2008); Susan B. Haire, Stefanie A. Lindquist &
Donald R. Songer, Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical
Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 143, 162-64 (2003); Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal &
Charlc3 M. Cameron, Thc Hierarchy of Justice: Tosting a PrincipalAgent Model of Supreme
Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 690-94 (1994); Matt Spitzer & Eric
Talley, JudicialAuditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649, 670 (2000).
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principle that the lower court had highlighted on remand. By taking
on the repeat case, the Court makes its original intentions clear and
helps preempt potential circuit conflicts.
The third and final category is "Incidental Repeaters." 12 Unlike
the preceding groups, Incidental Repeaters are not the result of
strategic cert grants by the Court. Instead, these cases earn their
status as Repeaters because they raise multiple cert-worthy issues at
different points in the litigation. The defining characteristic for these
Repeaters is that the Court's first review has little bearing on the
second review. Although the underlying controversy is the same, the
two cert grants are for distinct, substantive questions. For Incidental
Repeaters, it is purely an incidental fact of the matter that one case
produced two cert-worthy issues.
The analysis of these cases proceeds in three parts. In Part I,
we describe our methodology for identifying Supreme Court
Repeaters. In Part II, we present descriptive statistics of these cases.
This Part includes data on Repeaters' historical trends, common issue
areas, and ideological outcomes, among other information. Finally, in
Part III, we identify three categories of Repeaters. Through
illustrative examples in each of these categories, we argue that
Repeaters often serve a valuable purpose on the Court.
I. METHODOLOGY
Repeaters are merits cases that have been granted cert by the
Supreme Court on more than one occasion. Importantly, this category
does not include any summary orders, decrees, stays, per curiam
' 13
decisions, or other rulings that make up the Court's "shadow docket.
Only those cases for which the Court has received a full briefing,
heard an oral argument, and issued a signed opinion are eligible to
qualify as Repeaters. 14 In addition, our definition of Repeater excludes
cases that arose outside of the cert process, such as those that
qualified under the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction.
Unlike normal merits cases, Repeaters have two component
parts: an initial case and a repeat case. As their names indicate,
"initial case" refers to the first instance in which a continuing line of
12. See infra Part III.C.
13. See Will Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court's Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 1, 3-5 (2015) (describing the "shadow docket").
14. See id. at 5 (describing merits cases as those cases that "are at the center of the Court's
reP.11r ,~ions, which generally start At i0 9.m and feature regular oral argumento as well as
the announcement of opinions in a public ceremony").
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litigation appears before the Supreme Court, and "repeat case" refers
to a subsequent appearance before the Court. Generally, "repeat case"
denotes the second of two cases. However, for the small number of
cases that received cert more than twice, "repeat case" refers to any
15
iteration after the initial case.
Before discussing the identification process, one final point is
worth mentioning. We limited our investigation to Supreme Court
cases decided during the 1925 October Term through the 2015 October
Term. We start with the 1925 term because it is the year in which the
Court began the modern certiorari process. 16 Prior to that time, the
Court's discretionary review was much more limited, and a large
portion of its docket consisted of cases arising on mandatory
jurisdiction.1 7
With Repeaters defined and the timeframe established, the
next task was to identify relevant cases. Our first step was to compile
a list of all merits cases handed down by the Supreme Court during
the aforementioned terms. When possible, we used the bound volumes.
of the United States Reports to catalogue these opinions. We chose to
use the U.S. Reports because they are the authoritative source for
Court rulings.1 8 At the time of the data collection, the U.S. Reports
were available through the 2009 term. 19 For more recent terms, we
gathered decisions from the Supreme Court's slip opinions. 20 By the
end, we had catalogued approximately twelve thousand cases. With
this list in hand, we decided to employ two different but
complementary strategies.

15. For a discussion of Repeaters that received cert more than twice, see infra note 27.
16. This change was part of the Judiciary Act of 1925. See Act of February 13, 1925, Pub. L.
No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936.
17. Scec Arthur D. Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supremo Court's
Exercise of Discretionary Review, 44 PITT. L. REV. 795, 797 (1983) (noting that, prior to the
Judiciary Act of 1925, "the Court remained obligated to review large numbers of cases simply
becau3c the losing party in the court below asserted error, even where the ease had no
importance to anyone other than the litigants"); Jason Mazzone & Carl Emery Woock,
Federalism as Docket Control, 94 N.C. L. REV. 7, 27 (2015) (noting that the Judiciary Act of 1925
"relieved pressure on the Supreme Court by rendering a much greater portion of its jurisdiction
subject to certiorari").
18. See Bound Volumes, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, (July 21, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/8ZXC-HJZN]
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinionsfboundvolumes.aspx
(noting that "[t]he bound volumes of the United States Reports contain the fourth and final
generation of the Court's opinions").
19. See id. (providing access to the most recent volumes).
20. See Opinions, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, (July 21, 2016), http://www
.supremecourt.gov/opinions/opinions.aspx [https://perma.cc/AXL7-YBLRJ.
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One approach we took involved using Westlaw's "history"
function to view the direct history of each of the twelve thousand
merits cases. This function provided a graphical depiction of each
case's history that allowed us to determine whether a case had
appeared before the Supreme Court on more than one occasion. When
such a case was indicated, we reviewed the associated Supreme Court
opinions to determine whether that case qualified as a Repeater. In
theory, this process should have positively identified every Repeater.
In practice, however, because Westlaw's history function is not
comprehensive, we could not rely solely on this method.
Accordingly, a second approach we took involved comparing
each merits case with every other case with which it shared at least
one litigant. This method is based on the assumption that, for every
Repeater, at least one named party will appear in both the initial case
and the repeat case. Although this is not a necessary requirement of
Repeaters, we know of only one example that violates this
assumption. 21 Accordingly, we are confident that this search
methodology-when complemented by our Westlaw history search, a
process that is not sensitive to this assumption-has captured nearly
every Repeater.
To conduct this analysis, we wrote an Excel macro that
extracted every case that shared a party with any other case. The
macro identified cases as a match even if the common party's status
within the two cases differed. For instance, if "Lopez" were an
appellant in one case but an appellee in another case, the script would
nonetheless identify both cases as possible Repeaters. 22
Once we had this list of potential Repeaters, we proceeded to
manually examine every case. 23 This process involved reviewing the
opinion for each case and assessing whether it was part of the same
litigation as any other case that the macro had identified. To make
this determination, we focused our review on the case's procedural
history. If one case was the successor to another Supreme Court case,

21. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils.
Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
22. Unsurprisingly, this step showed that the vast majority of litigants were involved in
only one Supreme Court case. Of the thirteen thousand diotinct party namc3 in thc database,
fewer than three thousand appeared more than once.
23. We limited our comparison to cases involving at least one party that appeared twenty
or fewer times. This step was noccsary bccauzc party names that appeared more frequently
became unwieldy to manage and were unlikely to turn up repeated casC3. In the end, this
decision captured ninety-nine percent of all partic, co we belicc thio io a dcfcnoiblc decision
that best balances time against results.
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we coded the initial case and repeat case as part of a Repeater. This
method proved to be straightforward. In the vast majority of
Repeaters, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the present
controversy was a sequel to previous litigation, 24 and frequently, the
Court made this identification in the very first sentence. 25 Having
compiled these Repeaters, we were then able to examine their
descriptive features. In the next Part, we present those results.

II. FINDINGS
A. Historical Trend
eighty-four
methodology,
we identified
Through
our
Repeaters. 26 The set includes eighty-four initial cases and eighty-eight
repeat cases. The number of repeat cases exceeds the number of initial
cases because four Repeaters appeared before the Court more than
twice. 27 On average, the repeat case occurred four terms after the
initial case. The longest gap was twelve terms; 28 the shortest gap was
30
one term;29 and the most common frequency was two terms.

24. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 37 n.1 (1990) ("This litigation has come to us
once before...."); Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g,
176 U.S. 877, 878 (1986) ("This is thc occond time this Court has been called upon to address thio
jurisdictional controversy."); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 162 (1939) ("This case
is another phase of a litigation that has been here before.").
25. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 37 (1961) ('This case ... is a
sequel to Konigsberg v. State Bar of California."); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 188
(1946) ('This case is here for the second time."); Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 211, 212 (1935)
("What is before us is another chapter of a controversy that was here at the last term.").
26. For a complete list of these cases, see Appendix A. An additional thirty-seven cases
were reviewed by the Supreme Court more than once. However, because these eaeoc did not
receive cert, but rather arose under the Court's mandatory jurisdiction, we oxoludod them from
our dataset.
See Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006) (previously before the
27.
Court at Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003); Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc.
v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994)); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (previously before the
Court at Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990); Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989));
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (previously before the Court
at Dep't of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game
of Wash., 391 U.S. 392 (1968)); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935) (one of the Scottsboro
Boys Trials, the others being Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) and Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
28. This Repeater consisted of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001); and Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
29. Nine repeat cases were decided the term following their initial cases.
30. Twenty-five repeat cases were decided two years after their initial cases.

1356

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:5:1349

Although Repeaters make up a fairly small portion of the
Court's caseload, they do have a consistent presence on the docket.
Figure 1 shows that, in most years, the Supreme Court grants cert to
at least one repeat case. At the high end, the 1989 Term had four
repeat cases. Eight other years had three apiece, and a majority of the
remaining years had one or two.

FIGURE 1: REPEAT CASES, 1925 TERM - 2015 TERM

4

0
1925

1940

1955

1970
Year

1985

2000

+
2015

As the graph illustrates, the number of Repeaters stayed
relatively constant between 1925 and 2015. Despite this, the Court
actually hears proportionally more Repeaters today than it heard in
the first half of the twentieth century. This result arises because the
total number of cases decided by the Supreme Court has declined by
more than fifty percent over the last ninety years. 3 1

31. See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court's Shrinking
Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1225 (2012) (observing that "[slince the 2005 Term, the
Court has dccidud a avc'iage of 00 La;us pui Tui, fai' fevei than di roughly 200 uases it heard
earlier in the twentieth century"). Scholars have advanced a number of hypothcses for this
decline. See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court's
Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 750-93 (2001) (discussing how the elimination of
hThA
Cniirt'q mndqtnry juriedietion, the dpclring fre.qi ecy with which the federal government
cocks review, the growth of the cert pool, and other factors have served to reduce the Court'3
caseload); David R. Stras, The Supreme Court'. Declining Plenary Docket: A Membership Bascd
Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151, 153-61 (2010) (arguing that changes in the Court's
membership explain the decline).
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B. Issue Areas
Next, we turn to the most common legal issues involved in
Repeaters and compare them with the most common legal issues on
the Supreme Court's entire docket. 32 For Repeaters, three issue
areas-economic activity (23%), civil rights (22%), and criminal
procedure (18%)-account for nearly two-thirds of the cases. Judicial
power (9%) and First Amendment (8%) round out the top five and
bring the cumulative total over eighty percent. Although these issue
areas also dominate the Supreme Court's broader docket, there are
some differences.3 3 The most notable distinction is that civil rights
cases are a much larger part of the repeat docket than of the entire
docket (22% to 13%). The broader docket makes up this shortfall by
outpacing the repeat docket in cases involving federal taxation (7% to
1%). Using a chi-square test, we find that both these differences are
statistically significant (p < .05). Figure 2 provides additional
comparisons for the top ten issue areas in each category.
FIGURE 2: LEGAL ISSUES FOR REPEATERS
AND ALL SUPREME COURT CASES
All Supreme Court Cases
Repeaters
Issue Area
25%
23%
Economic Activity
13%*
22%
Civil Rights
18%
18%
Criminal Procedure
14%
9%
Judicial Power
8%
8%
First Amendment
4%
4%
Federalism
4%
4%
Due Process
1%
3%
Attorneys
7%*
1%
Federal Taxation
8%
11%
Other
* p < .05

The issue area breakdown suggests that constitutional
challenges are a prominent part of Repeaters, and indeed, more than
thirty percent involved a constitutional challenge. Figure 3 presents
the frequency with which litigants invoked specific constitutional
provisions. As the table shows, the Fourteenth Amendment was at
issue in more Repeaters (14%) than any other constitutional provision.
32. Data for these figures were drawn from the Supreme Court Database. See Harold J.
Spaeth et al., 2016 Supreme Court Database, Version 2015 Release 03, SUPREME COURT
DATABASE (April 8, 2016), http://supremecourtdatabase.org [https://perma.cc/HT8D-86A4].
33. See id.
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The First Amendment played a role in seven percent of these cases,
and the Sixth Amendment was involved in five percent of them.
FIGURE 3: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN REPEATERS
Repeaters 34
Constitutional Provision
Art. 1
2%
Art. 4
4%
1st Amend.
7%
4th Amend.
2%
5th Amend.
4%
6th Amend.
5%
11th Amend.
4%
14th Amend.
14%
Other 35
4%

C. Repeat Victory
Having examined the number of Repeaters over time and the
most prominent issue areas, we now shift our attention to case
outcomes. The vast majority of Repeaters result in a reversal of the
lower court decision. Overall, the proportion is seventy-seven percent
reversed to twenty-three percent affirmed.
Figure 4 goes one step further and breaks down the frequency
with which the Supreme Court affirmed and reversed initial and
repeat cases. In the initial case, the Justices reversed the lower court's
decision eighty-seven percent of the time and affirmed the decision a
mere thirteen percent of the time. Repeat cases were reversed sixtyseven percent of the time and affirmed thirty-three percent of the
time. 36 This data indicates that the Supreme Court is more likely to
reverse a lower court's ruling during its first review of the Repeater.
Additionally, a chi-square test reveals the difference to be statistically
significant (p < .05).

34
Some Repeaters raised more than one constitutional issue. In those instances, both
constitutional provisions are included for purposc of this table.
35
The following constitutional provisions were involved in one case each: Article III, the
Eighth Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment.
36. This figure is in line with the Supreme Court's reversal rate for its entire docket (64%).

2016]

SCOTUS REPEATERS

1359

FIGURE 4: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FOR REPEATERS

Affirm

Although this information tells us about initial cases and
repeat cases independently, it fails to indicate how the Supreme Court
treats Repeaters as a whole To determine that, we need to know how
both the initial case and its associated repeat case were decided. Given
that the Supreme Court has two options in both the initial and repeat
case (i.e., affirm or reverse), there are four possible permutations for
Repeaters.3 7 The boxes at the far right of Figure 4 present the
frequency with which each of these outcomes occurred.
Starting from the top, the diagram breaks down the outcomes
as follows: the Supreme Court (1) affirmed both cases in a Repeater
six percent of the time, (2) affirmed the initial case and reversed the
repeat case seven percent of the time, (3) reversed the initial case and
affirmed the repeat case twenty-seven percent of the time, and (4)
reversed both cases sixty percent of the time. As these numbers show,
the most common path is two reversals, and the least common path is
two affirmances.

For the four Repeaters that had more than two cases, we used tho original caso and tho
37.
final repeat in this analysis.
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One final point worth highlighting is the modest correlation
between winning the initial case and winning the repeat case. The
Court was somewhat more likely to side with the same party in both
cases. Specifically, for a litigant who won the initial case, the
likelihood of winning the repeat case was sixty percent.
D. Ideological Direction
Overall, Repeaters are more likely to be decided in a liberal
direction than in a conservative one. 38 Specifically, the split was fiftyseven percent liberal and forty-three percent conservative.3 9 This
distribution is slightly more liberal than the ideological split of the
Supreme Court's entire docket-which is fifty-three percent liberal
40
and forty-seven percent conservative.
With respect to Repeaters, we expected that the ideological
direction of the decision in the initial case would be predictive of the
ideological direction of the decision in the repeat case. After all, the
two cases deal with the same controversy and generally bring similar
issues. Additionally, given the short time lapse, the composition of the
Court is normally the same.
Interestingly, however, this is not the case. We found that
there is no ideological relationship between the outcome in the initial
case and the outcome in its associated repeat. Forty-nine percent of
the time, the cases within a Repeater were decided in different
ideological directions. Breaking this down further, twenty-one percent
of the time, a conservative repeat followed an initial liberal decision,
and twenty-seven percent of the time, a liberal repeat followed an
initial conservative decision. The remaining Repeaters (51%) were
ideologically consistent: thirty-two percent of the time, both cases
yielded liberal decisions, and nineteen percent of the time, both cases
yielded conservative decisions. Figure 5 summarizes these results.

38. To determine the ideological direction of cases, we used the Supreme Court Database
("SCDB"). See Spaeth et al., supra note 32.
39. The SCDB identifies the ideological direction of each case outcome. See id. We used
that coding throughout this section.
40. See id. The difference, however, is not statistically significant.
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FIGURE 5: IDEOLOGICAL DIRECTION OF REPEATERS
AT THE SUPREME COURT
Repeat Case
Liberal
Conservative
Initial Case
27%
19%
Conservative
32%
22%
Liberal

One point worth noting is that the proportion of liberal decisions
was higher in the repeat case (60%) than in the initial case (54%).
Given that the decision in the repeat case is normally the more
important one-both to the individual litigants and to the broader
legal community-this finding suggests that liberals are more likely
than conservatives to find success regarding the ultimate resolution of
Repeaters.
This, however, is not true in the lower courts. There, Repeaters
are more likely to be decided in a conservative manner. Specifically, in
the initial case, the lower courts issued a conservative decision fiftyseven percent of the time, and in the repeat cases, that number is
fifty-six percent. Figure 6 provides a more fine-grained analysis.
Based on the ideological difference in rulings between the lower courts
and the Supreme Court, it appears that, in both the initial and repeat
cases, the lower courts very often reach results that the Supreme
Court deems too conservative. Having explored some broader trends in
these cases, we now shift our focus to specific types of Repeaters.
FIGURE 6: IDEOLOGICAL DIRECTION OF REPEATERS
AT THE LOWER COURTS
Repeat Case
Liberal
Conservative
Initial Case
17%
40%
Conservative
27%
16%
Liberal

III. TYPES OF REPEATERS

Repeaters fall into three categories: (1) Procedural, (2)
Supervisory, and (3) Incidental. In this Part, we highlight cases from
each of these groups and show why Repeaters are a valuable part of
the Supreme Court's docket. Before proceeding, however, we pause to
emphasize that these categories should not be thought of as sharp
boundaries. Although most Repeaters fall into a single group, some do
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straddle the lines. 41 In these instances, we catalogued the cases
according to their dominant characteristics. That said, our purpose
here is not to vigorously defend the categorization of any individual
case. Instead, we are more interested in what the groupings indicate
about the Supreme Court's use of Repeaters.
A. Procedural
Procedural Repeaters occur when the Supreme Court disposes
of a procedural issue in the initial case and a substantive question in
the repeat case. 42 Our review of these cases suggests that the Justices
have employed Procedural Repeaters for three distinct reasons. At
times, they disposed of an initial case on procedural grounds in order
to postpone ruling on the substantive question. 4 3 The Court could have
addressed the substantive issue in its original opinion but for some
reason-perhaps due to the political climate-felt it best to delay such
a decision. Nonetheless, the Justices know that they will likely have to
address the substantive issue by taking up the repeat case or a
similarly situated case on a future appeal.
At other times, however, it is clear that the Justices really
wanted to tackle the substantive controversy and only granted cert to
the initial case in order to clear away a non-certworthy procedural
issue. 44 Finally, there were times where the desire to reach a certain
substantive question was so strong that the Supreme Court used the
initial case to reorient the trajectory of the Repeater so that it raised a
45
specific constitutional issue on a future appeal.
In total, Procedural Repeaters account for twenty-nine percent
of all Repeaters. Breaking down the data further, we find that the
procedural issues in these initial cases fall into three categories. In
thirty-nine percent of the Procedural Repeaters, the Supreme Court

41. For a case that could arguably be classified as either a Procedural Repeater or a
Supervisory Repeater, oce Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1961), remanding to
the lower court to "oupplomont the record with new findings"; and Campbell v. United States,
373 U.S. 487, 497 (1963), noting that Campbell I "demands that this Interview Report,
reasonably found to be an accurate copy of a written rtatement made the day after the robbery
hy Staull snd Pdopted by him q his own, be prodicihle for impeachment purpococ."
42. Substantive laws are "[t]he part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the
rights, duties, and powers of parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1658 (10th ed. 2014). These are
in contrast to "procedural laws," which are "[t]he rules that prescribe the steps for having a right
or duty judicially enforced .... " Id.
43. See Re, supra note 3 (discussing this possibility).
44. See id.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 72-84.
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resolved a jurisdictional issue in the initial case. 46 Thirty-five percent
of the time, the Court remanded the initial case because the lower
court had failed to make a necessary legal determination.4 7 And
finally, twenty-six percent of the time, the Supreme Court remanded
the initial case so that the lower court could undertake additional fact48
finding.
Notwithstanding the Court's specific reason for declining to
address the substantive issue, our investigation suggests that repeat
cases generally raise more noteworthy and complex questions. There
are several factors pointing in this direction. First, the opinions in the
initial cases were much shorter than those in the repeat cases.
Whereas the repeat cases averaged thirty-six pages, the initial cases
came in at a mere nineteen pages.
The second factor suggesting that repeat cases are more
important is the amount of scholarly attention that they receive. To
measure this, we used Westlaw to determine the number of law
review articles that cite to Procedural Repeaters. On average, repeat
cases in this category are cited nearly twice as often as initial cases
(374 times to 174 times). This is even more impressive given that
repeat cases lag several years behind their associated initial cases,
thereby giving less time for legal discussion to develop around the
case.
Setting aside these aggregate statistics, we now present several
cases that are illustrative of the broader set of Procedural Repeaters.

46. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2093 (2014) (finding that the
Convention on Chcmical Woapons "does not require the Federal Covernment to reach into the
kitchen cupboard, or to treat a local assault with a chemical irritant as the deployment of a
chemical weapon"); Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 226 (2011) (holding that "[t]here is no
basis in precedent or principle to deny petitioner's standing to raise her [Tenth Amendment]
claims"); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943) (holding that the Federal
Communication Commission's order does not violate the First Amendment); Nat'l Broad. Co. v.
United States, 316 U.S. 447, 449 (1942) (finding that the district court has jurisdiction to review
an order by the Federal Communications Commission).
47.
See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 608-10 (1951) (finding
the statute unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v.
McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1944) (vacating the lower court's determination as to a
statute's constitutionality and remanding for the lower court to first determine whether the
statute applies to the petitioner).
48. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534 (1979) (affirming the
Court of Appeals's holding that, "at the time of Brown I the Dayton Board was intentionally
operating a dual school system in violation of the Equal Protection Clause" (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419 (1977) (remanding "to the
District Court for the making of more specific findings and, if necessary, the taking of additional
evidence").
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The first example we discuss is Horne v. Department of Agriculture.49
This pair of cases is illustrative of those Procedural Repeaters in
which the Justices resolve a less important jurisdictional issue in the
initial case in order to reach a more important constitutional question
in the repeat case.
The controversy in this Repeater centered on a provision of the
National Raisin Reserve that required farmers to withhold a portion
(often close to half) of their raisin crop from the market. 50 Marvin
Horne, a raisin grower, refused to comply with the regulation and was
fined more than $650,000.51 Horne disputed the fine and filed suit,
alleging that the National Raisin Reserve requirement was an
unconstitutional taking of private property under the Fifth
Amendment.
As the case worked its way through the courts, the
constitutional challenge initially failed. Specifically, the district court
granted summary judgment against Horne,5 2 and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Horne lacked standing to even bring the
claim. 53 The Ninth Circuit's decision turned on a nuanced distinction
between raisin farmers and raisin handlers that had little application
beyond the immediate case.
Despite this procedural question's relative unimportance, the
Justices granted cert, and in Horne (I), a unanimous Court held that
the Ninth Circuit had erred; Horne did have standing to sue. 54
Although the Justices certainly wanted to tackle the more interesting
and more important constitutional takings question, they were bound
by their longstanding custom of reviewing only those issues on which
there is a developed record at the court of appeals.5 5 Accordingly, the
Justices declined to rule on the constitutional claim, instead,
remanding the case to the Ninth Circuit for a decision on the merits 56

49. Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015); Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053
(2013).
50. Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2056.
51. Id.
52. Horne v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. CV-F-08-1549 LJO SMS, 2009 WL 4895362, at *28
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009).
53. Horne v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 673 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
Court of Appeals "lack[s] juriodiction to addrers the merito of thc Hornco' taking3 claim").
54. Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2064 (ruling that "[t]he Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to decide
whether the USDA's imposition of fines and civil penalties on petitioners

Amendment).
55. See SuP. CT. R. 11.
56. Horne, 133 S.Ct. at 2064.

violated the Fifth
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On its second review, the Ninth Circuit tackled the substantive
issue and held that the National Raisin Reserve requirement did not
amount to an unconstitutional taking.5 7 Marvin Horne appealed the
judgment, and a little more than a year after its decision in Horne (I),
the Supreme Court granted cert. Following the Ninth Circuit's ruling,
the Justices were able to take on the interesting constitutional
question that had likely driven their cert grant in the initial case.
The Court did not waste the opportunity, issuing a seminal
Takings Clause decision, which held that both personal property and
real property receive the same level of protection under the Fifth
Amendment. 58 Relying upon this principle, the Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit and ruled that the National Raisin Reserve requirement
59
was an unconstitutional taking.
As noted, Horne is representative of those Repeaters in which
the Supreme Court clears away a preliminary jurisdictional issue in
order to set up an important substantive issue in a repeat case. Some
Procedural Repeaters, however, exhibit a different pattern.
Occasionally, the Supreme Court focuses on procedural questions not
to set up, but rather to avoid reaching the underlying constitutional
question. Generally, these Repeaters raise constitutional issues that
are salient to the American people. Rather than risk a public
backlash, the Supreme Court buys itself time by focusing on a minor
procedural question. The Justices know they will have to eventually
resolve the dispute-either when this case returns or when a similarly
situated case arises-but this procedural maneuver provides them
several more years to consider the constitutional issue and to gauge
public sentiment to determine how the decision will affect the Court's
legitimacy.
Fisher v. Texas is a recent example of this kind of Procedural
Repeater. 60 In Fisher (I), the Supreme Court was presented with the
question of whether the University of Texas's affirmative action
57. Horne v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that there
was not an unconstitutional taking because "the Takings Clause affords less protection to
personal than to real property").
58. Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015) ("Nothing in the text or history of
the Takings Clause, or our precedents, suggests that the rule is any different when it comes to
appropriation of personal property. The Government has a categorical duty to pay just
compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home.").
50. Id. at 2431 ("Raisins arc not like oyotcro: thcy are private property the fruit of tho
growers' labor-not 'public things subject to the absolute control of the state'.... Any physical
taking of them for public use must be accompanied by just compensation.").
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct.
60.
2411 (2013).
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program violated the Equal Protection Clause. At the initial
conference, Justice Kennedy, the swing vote on this issue, appeared
ready to side with the conservative bloc and rule against the
61
University of Texas.
After reading a draft of Justice Sotomayor's dissent, however,
Kennedy wavered.6 2 He was worried that Sotomayor's dissent would
draw substantial negative attention to the Court. 63 To allow time to
assess the public's opinion, Kennedy postponed the decision by
facilitating a compromise. Rather than rule on the constitutionality of
affirmative action, the majority (which now included two members of
the Court's liberal wing) opted to vacate the Fifth Circuit's decision
and remand the case. 64 The official reason for the remand was to
enable the lower courts to determine whether the University of Texas
had met the heavy burden imposed by strict scrutiny.6 5 Given the
Fifth Circuit's decision, however, this was both an unnecessary and
surprising step. 66 It was clear that the Justices' motivating purpose
was to set aside the issue for the time being. 67 This maneuver was, as
the Justices knew, only a short-term solution.
Three years later, Fisher was back before the Court. 68 In its
second iteration, the Repeater presented the same central question:
Was the University of Texas's affirmative action program
unconstitutional? Following oral arguments, legal scholars predicted a
loss for the university.6 9 They knew, though, that it would all come
61.

See JOAN BISKUPIC, BREAKING IN: THE RISE OF SONIA SOTOMAYOR AND THE POLITICS OF

JUSTICE 200-01 (2014) ('"Two days [after oral arguments], the justices took a preliminary
vote ....
[I]t initially looked like a 5-3 lineup. The five conservatives, including Justice
Kennedy, wanted to rule against the Texas policy and limit the ability of other universities to use
the kinds of admissiono programs upheld in Crutter v. Bolingcr. The three libcrals wcrc ready to
dissent.").
62. See id. at 205-09 (discussing the negotiations in Fisher (I)).
63. See id.
64. See Fisher,133 S. Ct. at 2418-20.
65. See id.
66. See Amy Howe, Finally!The Fisher Decision in Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24,
2013, 1:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/finally-the-fisher-decision-in-plain-english
[https://perma.ccB7CU-E4WY] ("Given how long it took the Court to decide this case (nearly
nine months), the seven to one vote came as somewhat of a ourprise.").
67. See id. (observing that "for now, and probably much to their relief, affirmative action is
off the Justices' plate").
68. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
69. Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: Now, Three Options on College Affirmative Action,
SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 9, 2015, 2:47 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/argument-analysis-

now- three -options on college affirmative action [httpo://perma.cc/GBX4 L2PF] (arguing that
"[t]he case.., now comes down to three options: kill affirmative action nationwide as an
experiment that can't be made to work, kill just the way it is done at the Texas flagship
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down to a single vote. Justice Kennedy had a decision to make. He
could side with the conservative bloc and vote against affirmative
action as he had on previous occasions. 70 Doing this, however, would
mean placing the Court at the center of a heated controversy, one that
was likely to be even more volatile than if the Court had struck down
affirmative action in Fisher (I).
In the preceding months, Justice Scalia had passed away and
racial tensions had reached a fever pitch. These factors, coupled with
Justice Kagan's decision to recuse herself from the case, meant that if
the Court made a sweeping constitutional change, it would be doing so
in a racially charged environment without a full complement of
Justices. Justice Kennedy was certainly aware of the attacks the
Supreme Court would be forced to endure in such a situation. Given
this state of affairs, it is almost certain that a desire to preserve the
Court's institutional legitimacy weighed heavily in Kennedy's decision
to side with the liberal Justices and uphold affirmative action. 71 Thus,
Fisher v. Texas provides a clear example of a Repeater in which
procedural issues were used to delay a decision that had the potential
to place the Court at the center of a significant controversy.
There is one final type of Procedural Repeater we will examine.
In these cases, the Justices use procedural maneuvers to reorient the
dispute so that, by the case's second pass, it raises the constitutional
question that they wanted to hear all along. Consider, for instance, the
landmark decision Employment Division v. Smith. 72 This case is
famous for upending free exercise doctrine by holding that neutral
73
laws of general applicability do not violate the First Amendment.

univcrsity because it can't be defended, or give the university one more chance to prove the need
for its policy"); Garrett Eps, Is Affirmative Action Finished?, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 10, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/20 15/12/when-can-race-be-a-college-admissionsfactor/419808 [https://perma.cc/8VZG-8LQYI (noting that it "seems unlikely" that Kennedy would
side with the liberal Justices in upholding affirmative action).
70. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387-91 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Gratz
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
71. Peter Jacobo, Justice Kennedy has Emerged as the Unlikely Hero of Affirmatiuc Action,
Bus. INSIDER (June 23, 2016, 11:04 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/justice-kennedythat
"the
(observing
[https://perma.cc/RKT4-V7WZ]
upholds-affirmative-action-2016-6
coniervative justiceD most lilicly persuaded themselves that Justice Kennedy will hold firm
rather than 3cck another temperature lowering compromise and that the ensuing heat would
be an institutional price worth paying" and commenting that "[i]t seems they were wrong"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
72. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
73. Id. at 870 (concluding that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that
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With that decision, the Court sparked a large controversy that
ultimately led Congress to step in and legislatively overturn the case.
Given this history, it is unsurprising that Smith has become a
staple in constitutional law casebooks and courses everywhere. The
case has also had a notable impact beyond the classroom, having been
cited in 1,700 court opinions and discussed in nearly five thousand law
review articles. 74 Constitutional law scholar Michael McConnell went
so far as to call Smith "the most important development in the law of
religious freedom in decades." 75 Regardless of one's thoughts on the
merits of the case, it is undeniably a seminal case of the Twentieth
Century. However, despite the case's prominence, there is something
not widely known about it: Smith is a Repeater.
In Smith (I), the majority's desire to rework the free exercise's
compelling interest test was already evident. 76 Here, the Justices were
presented with the question of whether a state may deny
unemployment compensation benefits to an individual who was fired
because his job requirements conflicted with his religious practices. 77
This case was, as Justice Brennan wrote, a "virtual clone of
precedent"-namely Sherbert v. Verner and Thomas v. Review
78
Board.
There was only one distinguishing factor. Whereas the
employees in Sherbert and Thomas had been fired for engaging in
religious activities that were legal, Smith had been fired for engaging
in a religious activity that was illegal (smoking peyote). Normally, this
difference would be sufficient to merit review. 79 However, the Supreme
Court of Oregon's ruling in the case made this particular distinction
irrelevant to any federal constitutional analysis. Specifically, the
justices on the state supreme court held that the Oregon legislature
had not sought to advance an interest in the enforcement of its drug
laws when it passed the unemployment compensation statute.
Therefore, the courts could not impute such intent to the legislature
the law prorcriboo (or proacribos) oonduct that hio rcligion precribco (or proscribco)" (intcrnal
quotation marks omitted)).
74. To determine these figures, we conducted a Westlaw search for "494 U.S. 872" in all
state and federal cases and in law reviews.
75. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, 1111 (1990).

76.
77.
78.
79.

485 U.S. 660 (1988).
See id. at 662-66.
Id. at 679 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 676 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Such an interest in criminal law enforcement

wnuld present s nnvel i-sne if it were in fact an intprest thst Orpgon had sought to advance in its

unemployment compensation statute.").
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when evaluating whether the state had a compelling interest
sufficient to overcome the burden on Smith's religious expression.
This left the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court with two
options. They could either dispose of this case by mechanically
applying precedent, or they could attempt to mold the case into one
they would prefer to hear. The majority chose the latter option. In
doing so, the Justices deliberately "misconstrued" the lower court's
opinion.8 0 Despite a lack of ambiguity in the Oregon Supreme Court's
opinion, the majority maintained that it was "not entirely
clear... whether the state court believed that it was constrained by
Sherbert and Thomas to disregard the State's law enforcement
interest."8 1 In light of this alleged confusion, the majority remanded
the case and instructed the lower court to determine whether the
82
religious use of peyote had violated state law.
The Justices may have found the lower court's opinion unclear,
but their own actions were completely transparent. The majority was
reorienting the case so that it would present a novel constitutional
issue. Despite the Oregon Supreme Court's findings, the Court was
determined to use this case to remake its free exercise jurisprudence.
As Justice Brennan wrote in dissent:
[T]his Court today strains the state court's opinion to transform the straightforward
question that is presented into a question of first impression that is not ....
Inevitably, each Term this Court discovers only after painstaking briefing and oral
argument that some cases do not squarely present the issues that the Court sought to
resolve. There is always the temptation to trivialize the defect and decide the novel case
that we thought we had undertaken rather than the virtual clone of precedent that we
actually undertook. Here, however, the Court's belated effort to recoup sunk costs is not
worth the price. Today's foray into the realm of the hypothetical will surely cost us the
respect of the State Supreme Court whose words we misconstrue. That price is
particularly exorbitant where, as here, the state court is most likely to respond 8to3 our
efforts by merely reiterating what it has already stated with unmistakable clarity.

Brennan's prediction was prescient. On remand, the Oregon
Supreme Court released a short, per curiam opinion that simply
reaffirmed its initial decision.8 4 This disposition, however, was

80.
See id. at 679 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 666.
82.
See id. at G69 (observing that "[tihe state court appears to havo asoumed, without
specifically deciding, that respondents' conduct was unlawful").
83. Id. at 675-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. See Smith v. Emp't Div., 763 P.2d 146, 148 (1988) (concluding "that the Oregon statute
against possession of controlled substances.., makes no exception for the sacramental use of
peyote, but that outright prohibition of good faith religious use of peyote by adult members of the
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sufficient to give the Supreme Court another crack at the case. And, as
we noted before, the Justices took maximal advantage of the
opportunity by using Smith (II) as a platform to completely remake
the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.
As these examples show, the Supreme Court uses Procedural
Repeaters in several different ways. Most times, as in Horne, the
Court disposes of a legitimate, although minor, procedural question on
the first pass. Other times, however, the court uses the procedural
disposition to delay a decision on the merits (Fisher)or to restructure
the initial case (Smith).
B. Supervisory
Supervisory Repeaters account for twenty-seven percent of all
Repeaters. This group is bound together by the following
characteristic: the repeat case serves to reinforce the holding in the
initial case. Sometimes, because the initial decision did not clearly
resolve an issue in dispute, this reinforcement is necessary. In these
instances, the repeat cases serve to clarify unsettled rules of law-a
85
central part of the Court's lawmaking function.
Supervisory Repeaters, however, also encompass those cases
that involve pure error correction. On these occasions, "the governing
legal rules are assumed to be clear, and the only issues are whether
the factual findings of the tribunal below are supportable under the
appropriate standard of review, whether the law was correctly applied
to the facts, and whether the procedures followed were improper or
unfair."8 6 When engaged in error correction, the Court does not clarify
an ambiguous decision so much as reprimand the lower court for
failing to properly apply an unambiguous holding from the initial case.
Because cases involving error correction are concerned only
with the proper application of settled laws and procedures, they
generally have little precedential value or importance to anyone
Native American Church would violate the First Amendment .... We thercfore rcaffirm our
holding that the First Amendment entitles petitioners to unemployment compcnsation").
85. See Hellman, supra note 17, at 796 (noting that "[iln its lawmaking role ... the
function of the 9ppNl!tp Court ip 'to 'ano1,ce, c!Arify, and harmonize the rules of docision

employed by the legal system in which [it] serve[s]."' (quoting PAUL D. CARRINGTON, DANIEL
JOHN MEADOR & MAUICE ROoEIMERG, JUSTICE ON APPEaL 2-3 (1076))).

86. Id.; see David P. Leonard, The Correctness Function of Appellate Decision-Making:
Judicial Obligationin an Era of Fragmentation,17 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 299, 302 (1984) (explaining
that error correction requires the appellate court "to determine, by whatever tcot io applicablc to
that particular kind of case, that the trial court correctly decided the questions that were
presented in the case").
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beyond the immediate parties. For this reason, many Justices have
argued against granting cert to such cases. 8 7 Justice Breyer, for
instance, wrote, "The United States Supreme Court is not a court of
error correction."8 8 Likewise, Justice Scalia observed that "it's not the
job of the Supreme Court of the United States to correct the
states ....Error correction-unless it's a capital case-is not what we
do."8 9 Further embodying this sentiment is Rule 10 of the Supreme
Court's rules of procedure, which states, "A petition for a writ of
certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of
erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated
rule of law." 90
Despite this rule of procedure and the Justices' opinions
regarding the practice, many of the Supervisory Repeaters do involve
error correction. There is, however, an explanation for this anomaly.
Unlike normal cases, Repeaters offer the Supreme Court an
opportunity to engage in a more direct and powerful form of
supervision.
In cases that appear only once, error correction's purpose is one
of general oversight. It allows the Justices to ensure that lower courts

87. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Error Correction and the Supreme Court's Arbitration
Docket, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 1, 5-6 (2014) (discussing the opposition of many Supreme
Court Justices to error correction cases); William Howard Taft, The Jurisdictionof the Supreme
Court Under the Act of February13, 1925, 35 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1925) ('The function of the Supreme
Court is conceived to be, not the remedying of a particular litigant's wrong, but the consideration
of cases whose decision involves principles, the application of which are of wide public or
governmental interest."); Chief Justice Frederick M. Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts,
Address Before the American Bar Association (Sept. 7, 1949), in 69 S. CT. v, vi (1949) ('The
Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily concerned with the correction of errors in
lower court decisions."). But see Sonia Sotomayor, Justice John Paul Stevens: Teaching by
Example, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 819, 819 (2011):
It is often said that the U.S. Supreme Court is not a court of error correction. But that
is not entirely true, and Justice Stevens had a particular instinct for identifying those
errors that warranted further review even absent a circuit split, a large amount in
controversy, or the involvement of a public figure.
88. Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role of Appellate Courts: A View from the
Supreme Court, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91, 92 (2006).
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia Addresses ABA Midyear Mecting in New
09.
Orleans, AM. BAR ASS'N (Sept. 29, 2011, 2:51 PM) http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/
aba-news archives/2013/08/u s-supreme-courtj.html [https://perma.cc/3ZUZ-FJPF] (quoting
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia); see also Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 12 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that when a case is "fact-bound" and "the Court of Appeals
unquestionably stated the correct rule of law," the Supreme Court is "most inclined to deny
certiorari" (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 460 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
90. SUP. CT. R. 10; see also Drahozal, supra note 87, at 1-2 (noting that "a common ground
for arguing again t the grant of certiorari is that the case is 'factbound' i.e., that it involvoc tho
application of settled law to the (possibly unusual) facts of the case" (footnote omitted)).
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have complied with the broad body of existing precedent. But in
Repeaters, error correction's purpose is one of specific oversight. It
allows the Supreme Court to uphold the integrity of individual
decisions. To some degree, both forms of error correction are necessary
to ensure that lower courts "obey the law" and "thereby promot[e] the
perception of legitimacy." 9 1 However, Repeaters that involve error
correction are more important in maintaining judicial legitimacy
because they prevent lower courts from blatantly disregarding or
misreading clear directions from the Supreme Court.
Although we have discussed error correction and clarification
as if they were distinct actions, they are perhaps more appropriately
conceived of as two ends of a continuum. Indeed, most Supervisory
Repeaters contain elements of both. In the remainder of this Section,
we discuss three cases that are representative of the Supervisory
Repeaters in our dataset.
The first example is United States v. Creek Nation.92 This case
involved a dispute over the federal government's taking of land from
the Creek Nation Indian tribe.9 3 Both parties agreed that
compensation was required but disagreed over how it should be
calculated. 94 Creek Nation maintained that the value of the property
should be calculated as of the date of the suit in 1926. 95 The Supreme
Court, however, sided with the United States, finding that the value
should be calculated as of the date of the taking, which it deemed to be
the day on which "the change of ownership [was] consummated by the
issue of patents."96 The Justices instructed the district court to
ascertain the dates on which these patents were issued and then to
determine the exact amount owed to Creek Nation.97
On remand, the district court set the date of the taking at
February 13, 1891, contrary to the Supreme Court's instructions. This
91. David Frisch, Contractual Choice of Law and the PrudentialFoundationsof Appellate
Review, 56 VAND. L. REV. 57, 75 (2003); see Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49,
51 (2010) (noting that error correction "merely considers whether the trial court erred in its
determination of what legal standard applies to thc disputc before it, in its application of a lcgal
standard to the facts of the case before it, or even, in some situations, in its determination of the
facts in the case before it").
92.
295 U.S. 103 (1935).
93. Id. at 105.
94. Id. at 107 (noting that "the parties were agreed that the lands in the strip were
uncoded Crook lands; and that ar to ouch of them as were disposed of under the act of 1891 the
Creek tribe is 'entitled to compensation' ").
95. Id.
96. Id. at 111.
97. Id. at 111-12.

2016]

SCOTUS REPEATERS

1373

date was not the day on which the patents were issued but instead
was the date of passage of a congressional act that allowed for the
land in question to be parceled and sold to settlers. 98 By selecting this
date, the lower court evidenced a clear misunderstanding of the Creek
Nation (I) opinion. Accordingly, in Creek Nation (II), the Supreme
Court overruled the lower court's determination and chastised it for
having "misinterpreted" the initial ruling.9 9 In correcting this error,
the Court quoted at length from its previous opinion and reaffirmed
that the "act of 1891 did not dispose of the lands." 10 0 The Court
remanded and once again instructed the district court to determine
the date on which the "change of ownership [was] consummated by the
issue of patents." 10 1
This Repeater is one of the clearest examples of error correction
in our dataset. In Creek Nation (II), the Supreme Court issued a
unanimous, three-page opinion that did nothing more than order the
district court to comply with Creek Nation (I). Unlike Creek Nation (I),
Creek Nation (II) neither added to the body of law nor created any
meaningful precedent. Its disposition was only relevant to the
immediate parties to the case. Nonetheless, the Repeater played an
important supervisory function by signaling to lower courts that they
must follow Supreme Court decisions or risk being admonished for
failing to do so.
The second Supervisory Repeater we will discuss is Penry v.
Lynaugh10 2 and Penry v. Johnson.10 3 This Repeater falls along the
middle of the continuum between error correction and clarification. In
Penry (I), the Court took up the question of whether executing a
mentally retarded individual would violate the Eighth Amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 10 4 The majority held that,
although the punishment was not categorically unconstitutional, the
jury must be instructed that it can consider the defendant's mental
retardation as a mitigating factor. 10 5 Because the jury was not given

98. See Creek Nation v. United States, 302 U.S. 620, 621-22 (1938).
99. Id. at 622.
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting Creek Nation, 295 U.S. at 111).
102. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
103. 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
104. 492 U.S. at 307.
105. Id. at 328:
[I]n the absence of instructions informing the jury that it could consider and give
effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry's mental retardation and abused
background by declining to impose the death penalty, we conclude that the jury was
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the appropriate instruction, the Court overturned the death penalty
10 6
conviction.
On retrial, the defendant was again convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. 10 7 The case was appealed, and the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury was
given sufficient opportunity to consider the defendant's mental
retardation as a mitigating circumstance. 108 On appeal, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas rejected
Penry's claim that the jury instructions were constitutionally
inadequate, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, after full briefing
and argument, denied a certificate of appealability. 10 9
Despite the Fifth Circuit's unwillingness to take up the
question, the Supreme Court granted cert to Penry once again.1 1 0
Ultimately, this repeat case ended in a 6-3 split, with the Court
overturning Penry's conviction a second time. Writing for the majority,
Justice O'Connor concluded that the trial court did not go far enough
in amending its jury instructions.1 She held that the lower court
ignored the mandate in Penry (I) by introducing "supplemental
instruction[s] [that] had no practical effect [and] were not
meaningfully different from the ones [ ] found constitutionally
inadequate in Penry L" 112 Framing this as a case of pure error
correction, the majority went on to argue that the lower court's ruling
was "objectively unreasonable"'1 3 and to reprimand the judge for
having "clearly misapprehended [the] prior decision. '1 4

not provided with a vehicle for expressing its "reasoned moral response" to that
evidence in rendering its sentencing decision.
106. Id. at 340.
107. 532 U.S. at 786.
108. Penry v. Texas, 903 S.W.2d 715, 766-67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
109. 532 U.S. at 791-92.
110. Id. at 786.
111. Id. at 804:
The three special issues submitted to the jury were identical to the ones we found
constitutionally inadequate as applied in Penry L Although the supplemental
instruction made mention of mitigating evidence, the mechanism it purported to
create for the jurors to give effect to that evidence was ineffective and illogical....
Any realistic assessment of the manner in which the supplemental instruction
operated would therefore lead to the same conclusion we reached in Penry I ....
112. Id. at 798.
113. Id. at 803-04. The Court observed that "it would have been both logically and ethically
impossible for a juror to follow both sets of instructions" contained in the trial court'3 modified
jury instructions. Id. at 799.
114. Id. at 797.
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The three Justices in the dissent, however, had a very different
view of the situation. They did not see this as an example of error
correction but rather as an instance of reinterpretation or expansion of
existing precedent. Specifically, the dissent argued that the trial court
had complied with the Supreme Court's ruling in Penry (I).115 These
Justices emphasized that "[i]n contrast to the first sentencing ... the
[trial] court instructed the jury at length that it could consider Penry's
proffered evidence [regarding mental retardation] as mitigating
11 6
evidence and that it could give mitigating effect to that evidence."
This instruction, they maintained, was sufficient to meet the standard
set forth in Penry (I).
This Repeater is an example of a case that blurs the line
between error correction and clarification. The majority thought they
were doing nothing more than correcting an obvious error. The dissent
and the lower courts, however, felt that the repeat case modified or
extended the decision in Penry (I).
The final Supervisory Repeater we will look at is Ticonic
National Bank v. Sprague.1 17 This case dealt with how debts should be
distributed following a bank insolvency. In the initial case, the Court
granted cert to determine whether a secured creditor is entitled to
interest for "any period subsequent to the insolvency of the bank,
when the assets on which he has a lien are sufficient to pay the
principal and interest but the total assets of the bank are not
sufficient to pay in full all creditors' claims as of the date of
insolvency."1 18 The respondent, Lottie F. Sprague, maintained that she
was entitled to interest payments for the period following insolvency,
and the Supreme Court agreed.1 19 The Court then directed the district
court to carry out its judgment by executing the district court's initial
decree allowing for interest payment.
Back in the district court, Sprague petitioned the judge to
award attorney's fees. On this issue, the district judge ruled that he
had "no authority to grant the petition" because the district court "had

115. Id. at 804-10 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. Id. at 806.
117. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Ticonic Nat'l Bank v. Sprague, 303
U.S. 406 (1938).
118. 303 U.S. at 407.
119. Id. at 413:
As the obligation to pay interest is not destroyed by the insolvency.., we are of the
opinion that a secured creditor of a national bank in receivership may enforce his lien
against his security, where it is sufficient to cover both principal and interest, until
his claim for both is satisfied.
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no further function to perform other than to carry out the mandate of
the Supreme Court when received." 120 In other words, the judge
believed that the scope of the Supreme Court's decision had foreclosed
Sprague's ability to submit a petition for attorney's fees. 121 On appeal,
1 22
the First Circuit agreed, and the Supreme Court granted cert.
In Sprague (II), the Court explained that its initial ruling
should not be read to foreclose claims, such as attorney's fees, that
arise under equitable jurisdiction. 123 Instead, Sprague (I) only settled
the statutory claims surrounding payments from an insolvent bank. In
this Repeater, the Supreme Court used the repeat case to clarify an
ambiguous element of the decision in the initial case. As these
examples illustrate, the key feature of a Supervisory Repeater is that
the repeat case works to reinforce the holding in the initial case.
C. Incidental
Every so often, a case with two different cert-worthy issues
comes along. On these occasions, the initial case and the repeat case
raise distinct substantive questions. Unlike in the previous types, for
this category, the Supreme Court's decision in the first case does not
act to clear the way for the second case nor does the second case serve
to refine or clarify issues addressed in the first. Instead, the initial
case and repeat case raise different substantive issues, and both could
have garnered cert independent of their repeat status. These cases are
what we call "Incidental Repeaters," and they account for forty-four
percent of the Repeaters in the dataset.
The Scottsboro Boys Trials are an excellent example of an
Incidental Repeater because they raise two unrelated, but extremely
important issues. The Scottsboro Trials are criminal cases from the
1930s in which nine black men were falsely accused of raping two
white women on a train in Alabama. 24 Despite overwhelming
evidence of their innocence, all nine were convicted in one-day trials,

120. Sprague v. Picher, 23 F. Supp. 59, 59 (D. Me. 1938).
121. Id. at 60 ("This court's authority and discretion in the case ceased when it was removed
to the appellate court, and now it can only follow the directiono of that court ao required by the
Supreme Court.").
122. 307 U.S. 164.
123. Id. at 168-69.
124. See Scottsboro: An American Tragedy, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/scottsboro/
timeline (last visited June 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/T3WV-H5VD] (providing a timeline of
events surrounding the trial).
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and all but one were sentenced to death. 125 During these trials, there
were a number of glaring procedural issues. In an effort to remedy
some of these problems, the Supreme Court granted cert to three
different cases involving the Scottsboro Boys.
The 1932 case of Powell v. Alabama was the first in this
series. 126 In Powell, the Court held that, with respect to capital crimes,
the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to inform illiterate
defendants that they have the right to counsel. 127 Additionally, the
Court ruled that, if the defendants cannot afford a lawyer, the state
must appoint one and allow sufficient time to prepare a defense. 128
Given its status as the first case in which the Court used the
Due Process Clause to overturn a state criminal conviction, Powell is a
notable decision. By requiring states to provide counsel to indigent
criminal defendants, Powell signaled that the Supreme Court had
bhgiin the long process of chipping away at structural inequalities in
the criminal justice system. Unfortunately, this ruling was not enough
to save the Scottsboro Boys from the false allegations.
On retrial, despite the assistance of counsel, the defendants
were found guilty again. Their convictions, however, were delivered by
an all-white jury from which blacks had been systematically excluded.
The defendants argued that such exclusion was unconstitutional, and
the Supreme Court granted cert on this issue in both Norris v.
Alabama129 and Patterson v. Alabama.1 30 In unanimous decisions, the
Court held that, by preventing blacks from serving as jurors, Alabama
had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
1 31
Amendment.
This line of cases is representative of Incidental Repeaters.
There is no real connection between the substantive issues decided in
125. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 148 (1987) (noting the existence of "testimony from one of the
'victims' that the attack never occurred").
126. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
127. Id. at 61-65.
128. Id. at 71 73 (observing how lack of effective counsel is,in certain circumstances, 'little
short of judicial murder").
129. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
130. 294 U.S. 600 (1935).
131. Norris, 294 U.S. at 589:
Whenever by any action of a state.., all persons of the African race are excluded,
solely because of their race or color, from serving as grand [or petit] jurors in the
criminal prosecution of a person of the African race, the equal protection of the laws is
denied to him, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States.
(citation omitted).
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the initial case (Powell) and those decided in the repeat cases (Norris
and Patterson). Certainly, the general controversy is the same. This
point is, after all, a requirement of all Repeaters. However, the two
substantive issues are distinct. Unlike in the other types of Repeaters,
the Court is neither clearing away some sort of procedural issue in
order to reach a substantive question nor using the repeat cases to
enforce or clarify a ruling that it had made in the initial case.
Incidental Repeaters are unique in that they involve substantive
issues that could just as easily have been raised by two unrelated
cases. Before concluding, we turn our attention to two other Incidental
Repeaters.
In Hewitt v. Helms, an inmate (Helms) asserted that the prison
violated his due process rights when it confined him to administrative
segregation. 132 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals sided with Helms,
ruling that his confinement was both a procedural and a substantive
violation of due process. On appeal, the Supreme Court in Helms (I)
determined that there was no Fourteenth Amendment procedural
violation 13 3 but left intact the lower court's ruling as to the substantive
violation. 134
Following this decision, Helms filed a § 1988 claim for
attorneys' fees.1 35 Normally, this would be a straightforward case, but
because Helms had been released from prison before the district court
could order injunctive relief, it was unclear whether he qualified as a
"prevailing party" under the terms of the statute. On review, the Third
Circuit held that Helms's legal victory was sufficient to meet the
definition of "prevailing party."1 36 In Helms (II), however, the Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that § 1988 required actual relief on the
137
merits-not merely a favorable judicial decision.
132. 459 U.S. 460, 462 (1983) ("[Helms] claim[s] that petitioners' actions confining him to
administrative segregation within the prison violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment....").
133. See id. at 477 ("[W]e are satisfied that respondent received all the process that was due
after being confined to administrative segregation.").
134. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 764-65 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("On remand
from this Court, the Court of Appeals noted that its substantive due process holding conccrning
the use of anonymous informant e-idence was unaffected by our decision ... .
135. See id. at 759.
136. See id. ('The Court of Appeals ...conclud[ed] that its prior holding that Helms'
constitutional rights were violated was 'a form of judicial relief which serves to affirm the
plaintiffs assertion that the defendants' actions were unconstitutional and which will serve as a
standard of conduct to guide prison officials in the future.' " (quoting Helms v. Hewitt, 780 F.2d
367, 370 (3d Cir. 1986))).
137. See id. at 760 (concluding that "a plaintiff [must] receive at least some relief on the
merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail").
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In the Hewitt v. Helms Repeater, the Supreme Court tackled
two different, but important, substantive issues. In Helms (I), the
Court engaged in constitutional interpretation-determining that the
prison's administrative segregation procedures had not violated
Helms' due process rights-and, in Helms (II), the Court engaged in
statutory interpretation-holding that Helms was not a "prevailing
party" entitled to attorneys' fees under § 1988.138 Both of these
matters were independently cert-worthy, and the Court's judgment in
the second case was not tied to its decision in the first case.
Yates v. United States is the final Incidental Repeater that we
examine. 139 In Yates (I), fourteen Communist Party officials were
charged with violating the Smith Act-a statute that made it illegal
for anyone to "organize" a society that advocates for the overthrow of
the government. 140 The dispute in Yates (I) was over the meaning 1 of
41
the word "organize." The government argued for a broad definition,
claiming that the term includes any activities that advance an
organization's goals.1 42 The Court, however, adopted a narrow reading,
concluding that "organize" means only to take part in the
establishment of a new organization. 143 Under this reading, activities
that carry on the mission of an already existing organization do not
qualify.144

In Yates (II), the named defendant appealed charges of
contempt. 145 At trial, Yates had refused to answer eleven questions
regarding the membership of other individuals in the Communist
138. A similar repeat pair is Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854-55 (1985), holding that the
Court of Appcaln ohould not have addihe,9cd the Fifth Amendment claim "bocausce the current
statutes and regulations provide petitioners with ... all they seek to obtain by virtue of their
constitutional argument"; and Comm'r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 165-66 (1990), finding that
respondents do not need to prove petitioners' position in fee litigation itself was not
"substantially justified" in order to be awarded attorneys' fees.
139. See Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298
(1957).
140. See 354 U.S. at 303 (noting that the Smith Act makes it unlawful for anyone to
"organize[ ] or help[ J or attempt[ ] to organizce any society, group, or assembly of peroons who
teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any (government in the United
States) by force or violence").
141. Sc, id. at 307 ('The Government urges that 'organize' should be given a broad meaning
since acceptance of the term in its narrow sense would require attributing to Congress the intent
that this provision of the statute should not apply to the Communist Party as it then existed.").
142. See id. (observing that the government argues that" 'organizing' is a continuing process
that does not end until the entity is dissolved").
143. See id. at 310 (concluding "that the word refers only to acts entering into the oreation of
a new organization, and not to acts thereafter performed in carrying on its activities").
144. See id.
145. See Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 67-68 (1957).
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Party. 146 For her actions, the district court held Yates in contempt
eleven times. 147 The Supreme Court granted cert on the question of
"whether the finding of a separate contempt for each refusal
constitutes an improper multiplication of contempts. 148 In reviewing
this issue, the Court reasoned that it would be unjust to allow the
prosecution to rack up multiple charges merely by asking a witness
variations of a single question. 149 Based on this analysis, the Court
150
concluded that only one count of contempt was justified.
Here, again, in the Yates Repeater, the Court resolved two
unrelated, but important, substantive issues. Neither the decision in
Yates (I) regarding the Smith Act nor the decision in Yates (II)
regarding the contempt charges had any legal relation to each other.
Although both decisions dealt with the same general controversy, this
connection was purely an incidental fact of the matter. Accordingly,
Yates is an Incidental Repeater.
CONCLUSION

This Article represents the first systematic analysis of
Supreme Court Repeaters. In conducting this investigation, we made
three contributions. First, we identified every Repeater that occurred
since the beginning of the modern cert era in 1925. Second, we
compared Repeaters to normal Supreme Court cases along a variety of
dimensions. We found that, although there are many similarities
between both groups, Repeaters do have several distinguishing
features. Third, we argued that there are three core types of
Repeaters-Procedural, Supervisory, and Incidental. Respectively,
these different Repeaters allow the Justices (1) to set up important
substantive questions that were initially blocked by procedural
hurdles, (2) to supervise lower court decisions, and (3) to address
distinct substantive issues that arose at different points in the
litigation.

146. See id. at 69 (noting that "petitioner refused to answer 11 questions which in one way
or another called for her to identify nine other peroono ao Communioto").
147. See id.
148. Id. at 68.
149. See id. at 73 (holding that "the prosecution cannot multiply contempts by repeated
questioning on the same subject of inquiry within which a recalcitrant witness already has
refused answers").
150. See id. at 74 ("We agree with petitioner that only one contempt is shown on the facts of
this case.").
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FTC v. lesner, 280 U.S. 19
(1929)

FTC v. Klesner, 274 U.S. 145
(1927)

Pagel v. Pagel, 291 U.S. 473
(1934)

Pagel v. MacLean, 283 U.S. 266
(1931)

Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 211
(1935)

Clark v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112
(1934)

Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
600 (1935); Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587 (1935)

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932)

McCandless v. Furlaud, 296
U.S. 140 (1935)

McCandless v. Furlaud, 293
U.S. 67 (1934)

Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302
U.S. 609 (1938)

Helvering v. Minn. Tea Co., 296
U.S. 378 (1935)

Creek Nation v. United States,
302 U.S. 620 (1938)

United States v. Creek Nation,
295 U.S. 103 (1935)

United States v. Shoshone
Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938)

Shoshone Tribe v. United
States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937)

Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank,
307 U.S. 161 (1939)

Ticonic Nat'l Bank v. Sprague,
303 U.S. 406 (1938)

Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338 (1939)

Nardone v. United States, 302
U.S. 379 (1937)

Schriber-Schroth Co. v.
Cleveland Tr. Co., 311 U.S. 211
(1940)

Schriber-Schroth Co. v.
Cleveland Tr. Co., 305 U.S. 47
(1938)

Palmer v. Conn. Ry. & Lighting
Co., 311 U.S. 544 (1941)

Conn. Ry. & Lighting Co. v.
Palmer, 305 U.S. 493 (1939)

""

pe*

denotes Procedural Repeater, "S" denotes Supervisory Repeater, and '" denotes

Incidental Repeater.
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Initial Case

Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,
315 U.S. 610 (1942)

Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,
288 U.S. 476 (1933)

Puerto Rico v. Rubert
Hermanos, Inc., 315 U.S. 637
(1942)

Puerto Rico v. Rubert
Hermanos, Inc., 309 U.S. 543
(1940)

Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB,
319 U.S. 533 (1943)

NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power Co.,
314 U.S. 469 (1941)

Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co.,
323 U.S. 574 (1945)

Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co.,
318 U.S. 54 (1943)

Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S.
274 (1946)

Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143 (1944)

Ballard v. United States, 329
U.S. 187 (1946)

United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78 (1944)

Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503
(1947)

Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S.
490 (1946)

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194 (1947)

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S.
80 (1943)

McComb v. Jacksonville Paper
Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949)

Walling v. Jacksonville Paper
Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1943)

Cole v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 345
(1949)

Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196
(1948)

NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co.,
340 U.S. 498 (1951)

NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co.,
337 U.S. 656 (1949)

Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)

Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v.
McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101
(1944)

Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280
(1955)

United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260
(1954)

Remmer v. United States, 350
U.S. 377 (1956)

Remmer v. United States, 347
U.S. 227 (1954)

Yates v. United States, 355
U.S. 66 (1957)

Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957)

Type*
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Initial Case

28

FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355
U.S. 396 (1958)

Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340
U.S. 231 (1951)

29

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957)

Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.,
366 U.S. 36 (1961)

Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.,
353 U.S. 252 (1957)

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961)

Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394
(1959)

Communist Party of U.S. v.
Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961)

Communist Party of U.S. v.
Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 351 U.S. 115 (1956)

FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368
U.S. 360 (1962)

FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363
U.S. 166 (1960)

Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963)

United States v. Shotwell Mfg.
Co., 355 U.S. 233 (1957)

Campbell v. United States, 373
U.S. 487 (1963)

Campbell v. United States, 365
U.S. 85 (1961)

Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
377 U.S. 179 (1964)

Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
363 U.S. 207 (1960)

Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476
(1964)

Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336
(1961)

SEC v. New England Elec. Sys.,
390 U.S. 207 (1968)

SEC v. New England Elec. Sys.,
384 U.S. 176 (1966)

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321
(1971)

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100
(1969)

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner
Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610
(1977)

Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969)

Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of
Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165
(1977); Dep't of Game of Wash.
v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44
(1973)

Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of
Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392
(1968)
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Initial Case

Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U.S. 267 (1977)

Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717 (1974)

Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332
(1979)

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974)

Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979)

Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977)

United States v. MacDonald,
456 U.S. 1 (1982)

United States v. MacDonald,
435 U.S. 850 (1978)

Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1
(1982)

Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647
(1978)

Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S.
87 (1983)

Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978)

United States v. Mitchell, 463
U.S. 206 (1983)

United States v. Mitchell, 445
U.S. 535 (1980)

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984)

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1
(1981)

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431
(1984)

Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977)

County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation of N. Y.,
470 U.S. 226 (1985)

Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y.
v. County of Oneida,
414 U.S. 661 (1974)

Bennett v. New Jersey, 470
U.S. 632 (1985)
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